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_____________ 
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_____________ 
 
In re:  TOWNE, INC and DMD TOWNE, LLC, 
            Debtors 
 
 
   THE MARGOLIS LAW FIRM LLC, 
                Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-05435) 
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
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Argued May 31, 2013 
 
Before:  JORDAN, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and  
RAKOFF*
 
, Senior District Judge. 
(Opinion Filed:  August 29, 2013) 
 
Seth L. Dobbs, Esq. (Argued) 
Martin G. Margolis, Esq. 
The Margolis Law Firm LLC 
5 Becker Farm Road, 4th Floor 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Anthony Sodono, III, Esq. (Argued) 
Trenk, DiPasquale, Della Fera & Sodono, P.C. 
                                              
* The Honorable Jed. S. Rakoff, United States Senior District Judge for the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 
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347 Mt. Pleasant Avenue 
Suite 300 
West Orange, NJ 07052 
 Counsel for Appellee Joseph Newman 
 
Joann Sternheimer, Esq. (Argued) 
Deily, Mooney & Glastetter, LLP 
8 Thurlow Terrace 
Albany, NY 12203 
 Counsel for Appellee BMW Financial Services LLC 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Margolis Law Firm LLC (“Margolis” or “The Margolis Law Firm”) appeals 
from the District Court’s denial of its motion to collect fees and expenses for its service 
as special counsel in the underlying bankruptcy case.  Although such fees and expenses 
are ordinarily chargeable only against the surplus of a debtor’s estate, Margolis seeks to 
collect them from proceeds of the sale of a secured creditor’s collateral pursuant to 
section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Because we agree with the District Court that 
Margolis does not meet the requirements of section 506(c), we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write primarily for the parties to this action.  Moreover, the District Court has 
ably provided the relevant background.  See In re Towne, Inc., Civ. No. 11-5435 (KSH), 
2012 WL 2401981 (D.N.J. June 25, 2012).  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts 
necessary to our analysis.   
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This appeal arises out of bankruptcy proceedings instituted by two related debtors: 
Towne, Inc. (“Towne”), which owned a franchised BMW motor vehicle dealership in 
Oyster Bay, New York, and DMD Towne, LLC (“DMD”), which owned the real 
property upon which Towne’s dealership was located.  Towne and DMD (collectively, 
“Debtors”) each filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Bankruptcy Court consolidated the cases and appointed The 
Margolis Law Firm as special counsel. 
 BMW Financial Services, NA, LLC (“BMW FS”) held a perfected first priority 
security interest in most of Towne’s assets (“the Franchise”), and also held a perfected 
first priority lien on DMD’s property (“the Property”).  Together, Debtors owed BMW 
FS $9,006,951.67.  
 On April 1, 2009, Margolis notified the Bankruptcy Court that it had received an 
offer to purchase the Franchise and Property (collectively, “the Collateral”) for six 
million dollars.  Given that offer, BMW FS – which in the meantime had successfully 
obtained relief in the Bankruptcy Court from the bankruptcy stay so that it could take 
possession of the Collateral – agreed not to pursue immediate liquidation to give Debtors 
the opportunity to complete the sale.  Because the offer was for less money than the 
amount of BMW FS’s lien, however, BMW FS refused to consent to the sale unless 
Debtors signed certain releases.  When Debtors refused to sign the releases, BMW FS, in 
turn, refused to consent to the sale, and the offer was withdrawn. 
 Several months passed without a successful sale of the Collateral.  Thus, the 
Bankruptcy Court converted the case to Chapter 7 and appointed a trustee.  Margolis then 
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withdrew from the case.  The Chapter 7 trustee executed releases on the Debtor’s behalf, 
and the Collateral was subsequently sold to affiliates of Len Stoler, Inc. (“LSI”) for 
$5,525,000.00.   
 The Bankruptcy Court later approved fees in the amount of $84,585.11 in fees and 
$3,626.90 in expenses for Margolis’ services as special counsel.  Margolis filed a motion 
arguing it was entitled under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) to collect these fees out of the proceeds 
of the sale of the Collateral.  The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding that 
Margolis did not meet the requirements of § 506(c).  The District Court affirmed, and 
Margolis filed this appeal. 
II. 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 1334, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings for clear 
error, but apply plenary review to its legal conclusions.  In re Visual Indus., Inc., 57 F.3d 
321, 324 (3d Cir. 1995).  Our review of the District Court’s decision is plenary “because 
[it] sits as an appellate court in bankruptcy cases.”  Id. 
 Margolis seeks to collect fees and expenses out of the proceeds of the sale of the 
Collateral.  In general, such fees and expenses are not chargeable against secured 
collateral.  Visual Indus., 57 F.3d at 324.  Instead, they ordinarily may be charged only 
against the surplus of the debtor’s estate.  Id.  However, section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides a limited exception to this rule, which allows a claimant to “recover from 
property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses 
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of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of 
such claim . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
 Section 506(c) is designed to allow a claimant who has expended funds to 
preserve or dispose of secured collateral to recover those funds from the secured creditor 
who directly benefitted from them, thus “prevent[ing] a windfall to the secured creditor at 
the expense of the claimant.”  Visual Indus., 57 F.3d at 325 (citing IRS v. Boatmen’s First 
Nat’l Bank of Kan. City, 5 F.3d 1157, 1159 (8th Cir. 1993)).  As we have explained, 
however, section 506(c) permits a claimant to recover expenses from the secured 
collateral only under “sharply limited” circumstances.  Id.  “[T]o recover expenses under 
§ 506(c), a claimant must demonstrate that (1) the expenditures are reasonable and 
necessary to the preservation or disposal of the property and (2) the expenditures provide 
a direct benefit to the secured creditors.”  In re C.S. Assocs., 29 F.3d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 Margolis asserts three theories for relief under section 506(c).  First Margolis 
argues that the costs and expenses of its legal services “were reasonable and necessary to 
the preservation and disposition” of the Collateral (Appellant’s Br. 12); second, Margolis 
asserts that BMW FS is estopped from denying that it benefitted from Margolis’s 
services; and finally, Margolis argues that it should be able to recover its fees and 
expenses under section 506(c) because its efforts to sell the Collateral were thwarted only 
when BMW FS sought releases from Debtors in violation of New York law.  We will 
discuss each theory in turn. 
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A. 
 At the outset, we reject Margolis’s argument that the proper inquiry under section 
506(c) is “whether [a secured creditor] benefited or could reasonably have been expected 
to benefit from Special Counsel’s efforts.”  (Appellant’s Br. 18.)  In support of this 
standard, Margolis cites to a 1980 decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
Bankruptcy Court.  See In re Hotel Assocs., 6 B.R. 108, 112 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).  We 
have not adopted the standard articulated in Hotel Associates.  Rather, we have read 
section 506(c) as requiring “a direct benefit to the secured creditors.”  C.S. Assocs., 29 
F.3d at 906.   
Applying this standard, Margolis fails to meet the requirements of section 506(c) 
because it cannot demonstrate either that its expenditures were necessary to preserve or 
dispose of the Collateral, or that its efforts directly benefitted BMW FS.  Although 
Margolis points to several services it undertook, including “exposing the Franchise and 
the Debtors’ single purpose Facilities for sale,” “soliciting prospective bids” for the 
Collateral, and “consummating purchase agreements,” (Appellant’s Br. 18), these efforts 
did not result in an actual sale.  Instead, BMW FS, along with the Chapter 7 trustee, sold 
the Collateral to LSI after the case had been converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 and 
Margolis had already withdrawn.  As the District Court noted, an affidavit submitted by 
Eliot Wagonheim, an attorney who represented LSI in negotiations for the purchase of 
the Collateral, supports the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that Margolis was not 
responsible for LSI’s interest in, or eventual purchase of, the Collateral.  See Towne, 2012 
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WL 2401981 at *7.  We therefore agree that Margolis fails to prove that its efforts were 
necessary to the preservation or disposition of the Collateral. 
 Margolis also fails to demonstrate that it provided a direct benefit to BMW FS.  
Margolis argues its efforts prevented termination of the Franchise, and that this benefitted 
BMW FS by preserving the value of the Collateral.  The Bankruptcy Court dismissed this 
assertion as “purely speculative,” noting that BMW of North America, LLC (“the 
Franchisor”) did not terminate the franchise after the case was converted to Chapter 7 and 
Margolis had withdrawn.  (A. 7.)  The District Court agreed, concluding that Margolis 
failed to prove that the franchise would have been terminated without its efforts.  Towne, 
2012 WL 2401981, at *7. 
 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that “the primary benefit of 
[Margolis’s] legal services was to the Debtors . . . rather than to preservation of the 
collateral of BMW FS.”  (A. 8.)  In making this finding, the Bankruptcy Court observed 
that Margolis seeks reimbursement for numerous services that were actually contrary to 
BMW FS’s interests, including efforts to reduce the value of BMW FS’s lien and 
conducting research that led to an administrative proceeding against BMW FS in state 
court.  These findings are amply supported in the record and are not clearly erroneous.   
We also reject Margolis’s alternative argument that BMW FS consented to be 
surcharged for Margolis’s efforts.  Although some courts have considered a secured 
creditor’s consent in analyzing a claim under section 506(c), see, e.g., In re Flagstaff 
Foodserv. Corp., 739 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1984), Margolis has shown no more than 
BMW FS’s limited cooperation with its initial efforts to effectuate a sale of the 
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Collateral.  BMW FS’s limited cooperation does not demonstrate consent to be charged 
for all of Margolis’s efforts.  Id. (“‘[Consent] is not to be inferred merely because a 
secured creditor cooperates with the debtor.’”) (quoting In re S & S Indus., Inc., 30 B.R. 
395, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)). 
Accordingly, and for substantially the same reasons as the District Court, we 
conclude that Margolis did not demonstrate that the fees and expenses for which it seeks 
compensation were “reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing 
of, [the collateral],” 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), or that its expenditures provided a direct benefit 
to BMW FS. 
B. 
 Margolis next asserts that BMW FS is estopped from denying that it benefitted 
from Margolis’s services because BMW FS “secretly collaborated with [Franchisor] and 
Debtor’s trustee for the purpose of achieving various unlawful objectives.”  (Appellant’s 
Br. 23.)  Specifically, Margolis contends that BMW FS, Franchisor, and LSI conducted a 
“comfortable, concealed relationship,” which resulted in “favoritism” that led to the sale 
of the Collateral to LSI.  (Id. 23, 24.)   Margolis asserts that this concealed collaboration 
led it to perform extensive work in vain. 
 We need not address the merit of these claims because, as the District Court 
explained, Margolis “cites no case, statute, or other authority to indicate that such a form 
of estoppel has ever been recognized.”  2012 WL 2401981, at *9.  We therefore reject 
Margolis’s contention that BMW FS is estopped from denying that it benefitted from the 
efforts of the Margolis Law Firm. 
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C. 
 Finally, Margolis argues that BMW FS “impeded the sale of the franchise and 
facilities in order to secure releases . . . in direct contravention of the New York 
Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act.”  (Appellant’s Br. 28.)  Like the District Court, we 
express no view on the merits of this argument because the question of whether or not 
BMW FS sought releases from Debtors in violation of New York law is not relevant to 
our analysis under section 506(c).  Margolis cannot identify language in section 506(c) or 
prior cases of ours supporting its theory that a secured creditor’s allegedly unlawful 
conduct justifies relief to a claimant under section 506(c).  Thus, we conclude that 
Margolis’s argument that BMW FS violated New York law, even if true, would not 
provide a ground for relief under section 506(c).    
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
